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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 12, 1984, a Chamber1 of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) delivered a judgment in the case Concerning the Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area.2 This case involved delimi-
tation of a single boundary' for both the continental shelf and fisheries
zones." Although the Court had decided two previous cases concerning the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries,5 these cases gave little direct
guidance as to how the Court would deal with delimitation of boundaries
for fisheries zones or exclusive economic zones8 or how it would delimit a
I. The Chamber was composed of Judge Ago, President of the Chamber, Judges Gros,
Mosler, and Schwebel and Judge ad hoc Cohen. Judge Schwebel voted with the majority but
wrote a separate opinion. Judge Gros dissented. See infra text accompanying notes 51-52 for a
discussion of the use of the chamber procedure.
2. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.
v. U.S.), 1984 .C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984). See
generally Charney, Ocean Boundaries Between Nations: A Theory for Progress, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 582 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Charney, Ocean Boundaries]; Collins & Rogoff, The
International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 34 ME. L. REV. I (1982); McRae,
Adjudication of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 292
(1979) [hereinafter cited as McRae, Adjudication]; Rhee, Equitable Solutions to the Mari-
time Boundary Dispute Between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 590 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rhee, Equitable Solutions]; Swan, That Gulf of
Maine Dispute: Canada and the United States Delimit the Atlantic Continental Shelf, 10
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 405 (1977); Comment, Boundary Delimitation in the Economic Zone:
The Gulf of Maine Dispute, 30 ME. L. REV. 207 (1979); Note, International Adjudication:
Settlement of the United States-Canada Maritime Boundary Dispute, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J.
138 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, International Adjudication].
A bibliography of the literature in this area of the law has been assembled in T. MCDOR-
MAN, K. BEAUCHAMP & D. JOHNSTON, MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1982).
3. Judge Gros felt that the Court should have discussed the appropriateness of a single
boundary, even though it was stipulated by the parties. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 362-64
(paras. 5, 6) (Gros, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the legality of international adjudication
on a basis agreed to by the parties, see C. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AD-
JUDICIATION 604-16 (1964).
4. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 253.
5. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 340 (1969); Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tuni-
sia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 24), reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
225 (1982).
6. The concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was developed initially by Latin
American countries in the early 1970s in response to the threat posed by distant water fishing
fleets from more advanced states. Many countries have declared EEZs since then. By declaring
an exclusive economic zone, a country claims exclusive jurisdiction over all natural resources in
the water column and the seabed in that zone. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
recognizes each coastal country's right to an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 miles. Col-
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single boundary for both purposes. In its opinion in the Gulf of Maine case,
the Chamber states that the fundamental norm in maritime boundary de-
limitation is that it "is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria
and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the
geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an
equitable result." 7
This formulation is similar to the general principles set forth in the
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case.8 The opinions are similar in other
ways. Both state that the choice of equitable principles and delimitation
methods varies from case to case and is within the Court's discretion, 9 and
both emphasize geography, including the lengths of coastal fronts. 10
The Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf judgment was criticized by the
dissenting judges" and by some commentators" as "lacking in legal princi-
ples, verging on an unauthorized determination ex aequo et bono and pro-
viding little guidance for the delimitation of maritime boundaries in other
disputes.' 3 Judge Gros, in his dissent to the Chamber's opinion in the Gulf
lins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 3 n.9.
For a discussion of the development of the exclusive economic zone concept, see generally
Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569 (1975); Clingan, Emerging Law of the Sea: The Economic Zone
Dilemma, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 530 (1977).
National Legislation and bilateral treaties by various countries which declare exclusive
economic zones are collected in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (M. Nordquist &
K.R. Simmonds eds. 1980).
7. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 300 (para. 112(2)).
8. In the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court laid down a general rule that "delimitation is to
be effected in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all relevant circum-
stances," Tunisia/Libya case, 1982 I.C.J. at 92 (para. 133 A(l)), and undertook to balance
the various considerations which it regards as relevant in order to produce an equitable result.
Id. at 60 (para. 71). Feldman, The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: Geographic Justice
or Judicial Compromise? 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 219 (1983).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 179-96 for discussion of this issue.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 212-20 for discussion of proportionality.
I1. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 143, 153 (paras. 18, 19) (Gros, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 157, 157 (para. 1) (Oda, J., dissenting); Id. at 278, 296 (para. 14) (Evensen,
J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g.. Charney, Ocean Boundaries, supra note 2, at 584-85; Charney, Remarks,
ICJ Decision in the Libya-Tunisia Continental Shelf Case, 76 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 155,
155 (1982). But cf. Christie, From the Shoals of the Ras Kaboudia to the Shores of Tripoli:
The Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Delimitation, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 3 (1983);
Feldman, supra note 8, at 220. For other discussions of the TunisiolLibyan case, see generally
Hodgson, The Tunisio-Libyan Continental Shelf Case, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984);
Stein, Remarks, ICJ Decision in the Libya-Tunisia Continental Shelf Case, 76 AM. Soc. INT'L
L. PROC. 161 (1982).
13. Feldman, supra note 8, at 220. Feldman says that "[W]hile recognizing some merit
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of Maine case, criticizes it for the same faults and considers the Gulf of
Maine decision to be a continuation of the result-oriented, arbitrary use of
"equity" which began in the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf judg-
ment and which has been encouraged by the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea.14
Part II of this note will outline the background of the Gulf of Maine
dispute. The formation of the Chamber for the case-the first in which the
chamber procedure was used-will be briefly discussed in Part III. Parts IV
and V will summarize the arguments of the parties and the reasoning of the
Chamber, as well as the results reached in the adjudication. Finally, Part
VI contains an analysis of the opinion, highlighting its strengths and
weaknesses.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
The Gulf of Maine area 5 consists of a concave, island-fringed coast-
line where the United States and Canada are situated as adjacent, and in
some places arguably opposite, states. (See Map 1.) The Georges Bank,
particularly its northeastern third, is the focus of the jurisdictional dispute
because of the valuable fisheries and hydrocarbon resources located there."6
in these concerns, [he] believes the Court has taken a significant step towards the formulation
of integrated principles that can be applied to the delimitation of unitary maritime boundaries
governing both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone." Id.
14. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 382-83 (para. 38) (Gros, J., dissenting).
15. The Gulf of Maine covers approximately 25,000 square miles and has an average
depth of 150 meters. A major feature in the area is Georges Bank, long a famous fishing
ground, now an area of oil and gas potential. Shaped like an oval, Georges Bank is about
180 miles long and 90 miles wide with an area of approximately 12,000 square miles. To
the northeast, Georges Bank is separated from Browns Bank by the Northeast Channel
or Fundian Channel, about 240 meters deep; to the southwest, the shallower Great South
Channel, about 80 meters deep, lies between the Bank and Cape Cod. Most of Georges
Bank is 30 to 80 meters deep. For more geographical information, see generally S. APOL-
LONIO, THE GULF OF MAINE passim (1979).
Rhee, Equitable Solutions, supra note 2, at 590 n.1 (1981). See also D. VANDERZWAAG, THE
FISH FEUD 1-2 (1983); Comment, supra note 2, at 238.
16. The average estimate of recoverable hydrocarbon deposits on Georges Bank as a
whole is 0.9 billion barrels, and 4.4 trillion cubic feet of gas, based on the United States
Geological Survey. Of this, about 7 to 10% might be deposited in the disputed northeast-
ern third of Georges Bank. See U.S. Geological Survey, North Atlantic District, Georges
Bank Monitor 2 (No. 1, July 1980). Because of the possible environmental impact upon
fisheries, not all of the oil and gas would be recoverable. Hydrocarbon reserves in the
undisputed U.S. zone of Georges Bank relating to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
Sale No. 42 are estimated to be 123 million barrels of oil and 870 billion cubic feet of
natural gas, having a net value of $588 million. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Georges Bank Marine Sanctuary Paper 24-49,
[Vol. 9
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MAP No. 1
GENERAL MAP OF THE REGION, SHOWING THE STARTING-POINT FOR THE
DELIMITATION LINE AND THE AREA FOR ITS TERMINATION
Reprinted from 23 I.L.M. 1197, 1209 (1984).
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OCS SALE No. 42, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL TO
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 515-20 (1979). Based on the adjusted value of 1978 land-
ings of $167 million, the value of the fisheries of Georges Bank over the next 20 years
would be estimated at $3.34 billion. [ld.] Comparing this figure with the net value of the
hydrocarbon deposits, which are likely to be exhausted in one generation, it is fair to
conclude that the renewable fisheries resources are much more valuable than the hydro-
carbon deposits in Georges Bank.
Rhee, Equitable Solutions, supra note 2, at 592 n.8. See also D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note
15, at 3-35; Comment, supra note 2, at 234 n.90 and sources cited therein.
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A. The Continental Shelf Controversy
The oceanward extension of the territorial sea boundary 7 was not an
area of serious controversy for the United States and Canada until the late
1960s. The United States government had issued the Truman Proclamation
in 1945,18 which included a provision that the boundary of the continental
shelf was to be determined in accordance with "equitable principles." In
1964, relying on principles of equidistance contained in the 1958 Continen-
tal Shelf Convention,' 9 Canada issued geological exploration permits to pe-
troleum companies for the Georges Bank area lying on the Canadian side of
the equidistance line.2 ° In 1969, subsequent to the decision in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases,"' the United States refused to recognize the
validity of the Canadian permits.
On November 5, 1969, the United States asserted that the Northeast
Channel should be the boundary in the Gulf of Maine and challenged the
17. The territorial sea boundary starts at a designated point in the mouth of the St. Croix
River, passes in a southwesterly direction between the U.S. coast of Maine and the Cana-
dian Deer and Campobello Islands to a fixed point in the Grand Manan Channel, and
then moves southwesterly through the middle of the Channel until it meets a point where
the distance from the nearest base points becomes 3 miles. See Treaty concerning the
Canadian International Boundary, April 11, 1908, 35 Stat. 2003, T.S. No. 497, 12 Bev-
ans 297. See also Treaty concerning the Boundary Line in Passamaquoddy Bay, May 21,
1910, 36 Stat. 2477, T.S. No. 551, 12 Bevans 341; Treaty in regard to the Boundary
between the United States and Canada, Feb. 24, 1925, 44 Stat. 2102, T.S. No. 720, 6
Bevans 7.
Rhee, Equitable Solutions, supra note 2, at 590 n.2.
18. See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884.
Before issuing the Proclamation, the United States government contacted the governments of
Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. There was no challenge, how-
ever, from any country. Rhee, supra note 2, at 591 n.3. See A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POL-
ICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 18-61 (1981).
19. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 6, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311. Canada was not a signatory to the convention when it
took this action. See infra note 84 for text of Article 6.
20. See Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, Canadian View of the Gulf of Maine/
Georges Bank Boundary Line, Press Release (June 10, 1977).
This equidistance line is shown on Map 2. An equidistance line is the line every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the territorial seas of
the two countries are measured. For a detailed explanation of the methods used in delimiting
an equidistant boundary, see Hodgson & Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of a Modern
Equidistant Boundary, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 361 (1976).
21. The ICJ had stated that the delimitation clause to the 1958 Convention was not gen-
eral international law, and thus not binding on non-parties to the convention. The Court held
that the continental shelf should be delimited in accordance with equitable principles, taking
account of all relevant circumstances. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 384 (para.
l0l(c)(1)).
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eleven-year-old Canadian exploration permits.22 In response, Canada re-
jected the American claim and acceded to the 1958 Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf-the treaty whose equidistance principle formed the basis of
Canada's claim-on February 6, 1970.23 At this point the parties began
negotiations, but no progress was made until the mid-1970s.
B. Negotiations After the Declaration of 200-Mile Fishery Jurisdiction
In the mid- 1970s declarations of 200-mile zones of jurisdiction and the
concept of the exclusive economic zone were a growing trend worldwide. 24
On April 13, 1976, the United States Congress enacted the Fisheries Con-
servation and Management Act,25 which extended the exclusive fisheries
zone-an application of the exclusive economic zone concept-from 12 to
200 miles as of March 1, 1977. Canada published its claim to a 200-mile
fishery jurisdiction on November 1, 1976. The boundary line claimed was
based on equidistance principles and was to become effective on January 1,
1977.26 On November 4, 1976, the United States published its claimed
boundary, which roughly followed the mid-channel line of the Northeast
Channel. 27 (See Map 2 for the parties' claims at this point in the dispute.)
22. The U.S. Department of State issued a public notice on Feb. 12, 1970, concerning its
position with respect to the Georges Bank continental shelf, which had already been expressed
to Canada in a diplomatic note of Nov. 5, 1969:
[T]he U.S. Government has refrained from authorizing geologic exploration or mineral
exploration in the area of the Georges Bank continental shelf. Pending agreement on the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Maine, the U.S. Government does not
acquiesce in or recognize the validity of permits or other authorizations issued by the
Government of Canada to explore or exploit the natural resources of any part of the
Georges Bank continental shelf, and reserves its rights and those of its nationals in that
area.
Rhee, supra note 2, at 591 n.7. See 35 Fed. Reg. 3301 (1970).
23. See United Nations, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General
Performs Depositary Functions 452, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D./8 (1975). Canada appended
a declaration-apparently with the United States claim in mind--stating that it would not
consider the presence of an accidental feature such as a depression or a channel in a sub-
merged area as constituting an interruption of the natural prolongation of its land territory.
24. See supra note 6.
25. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). See
generally A. HOLLICK, supra note 18. For a general discussion of the United States fisheries
management system, see D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 15, at 37-67.
26. Rhee, Equitable Solutions, supra note 2, at 593. See Johnson, Canadian Foreign
Policy and Fisheries, in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 52 (B. John-
son & M. Zacher eds. 1977). For a general discussion of the Canadian fisheries management
system, see D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 15, at 63-87.
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 506, MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 48,619 (1976).
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MAP No. 2
LIMITS OF FISHERY ZONES AND CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMED BY THE
PARTIES, AT 1 MARCH 1977
United States line--------
Canadian line ........
Reprinted from 23 I.L.M. 1197, 1217 (1984).
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The parties reached an interim agreement on reciprocal fisheries for
1977 on February 24 of that year.28 On August 2, 1977, special negotiators
of ambassadorial rank were appointed to conduct a comprehensive negotia-
tion for fishery resources and maritime boundaries.2 9 On June 2, 1978, the
Canadians suspended the interim agreement. 30 Chaos followed. Fishermen
from each country were excluded from the other country's zone and the
disputed areas were overfished by fishermen from each side."1 As the situa-
tion worsened, Canada published a revised claim on September 15, 1978, to
an additional 2,880 square miles, including 1,500 square miles, or 15 per-
cent, of the Georges Bank.3 2 (See Map 3.) The United States protested this
claim vehemently. 33
Negotiations were resumed. In October 1978, the negotiators deter-
mined that, although they had reached agreement on most of the fisheries
questions, they were unable to resolve the maritime boundary question,
which they recommended submitting to binding third-party settlement.
Both governments accepted this recommendation.3 4 On March 29, 1979,
the parties concluded two separate, but interrelated, agreements: the Fish-
eries Agreement3 5 and the Boundary Settlement Treaty.
36
28. See 76 DEP'T ST. BULL. 274 (1977). See also Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting a Proposed Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States and the Government of Canada, HR. EXEC. Doc. No. 90, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
29. Rhee, supra note 2, at 594. "The negotiators announced their joint report on Oct. 15,
1977, which specified basic principles for governing the cooperative management of fishing
resources and the utilization of hydrocarbon deposits straddling the boundaries." Id.
30. See 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38 (1978).
31. Rhee, supra note 2, at 594.
32. The revised Canadian claim largely based on an assessment of the 1977 award in the
Anglo-French Continental Shelf arbitration [Concerning the Delimitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 3 (1977), reprinted in 54 I.L.R. 11
(1979) and in 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979)] was arrived at by drawing a so-called equitable
equidistance line that discounted the effect of Cape Cod and the island of Nantucket.
Id.
33. The United States "consider[ed] the new Canadian claim to be without merit" and
asserted that "any attempt by Canadians to fish beyond the initial Canadian claim would meet
with United States enforcement action." See U.S. Dep't of State, File No. P78 0160-2316,
reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 132 (1979). See also 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 43 (1978).
34. Rhee, supra note 2, at 595.
35. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of
Canada on East Coast Fishery Resources, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting the Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources with Canada, S. EXEC. Doc. V,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 9 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 157
(M. Nordquist & K. Simmonds eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Fisheries Agreement].
36. Treaty Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada
to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the
1985]
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C. The Demise of the Fisheries Agreement
The Fisheries Agreement set forth detailed rules for harmonious shar-
ing of resources, mutual access and cooperative management of fish stocks.
Three categories of management were established: joint management for
MAP No. 3
DELIMITATION LINES PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES BEFORE THE CHAMBER
United States line-------
Canadian line ........
Reprinted from 23 I.L.M. 1197, 1219 (1984).
Gulf of Maine Area, Mar. 29, 1979, United States-Canada, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10204,
reprinted in 9 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 167 (M. Nordquist & K. Simmonds
eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Boundary Settlement Treaty].
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transboundary stocks, primary management for stocks of overriding inter-
est, and independent management for stocks in undisputed areas."7 It also
provided for a dispute settlement mechanism 8 and a joint fisheries commis-
sion.3 9 The Agreement was meant to be permanent with entitlement to the
stocks subject to review.'
The Agreement was controversial in the United States.' The New
England fishing communities lobbied against it at Congressional hearings.'
2
The pertinent committees decided that while the Boundary Settlement
Treaty 43 was uncontroversial and useful, the Fisheries Agreement should
not be ratified because it was unfair to the United States." On March 6,
1981, President Reagan withdrew the Fisheries Agreement from considera-
tion by the Senate and asserted that "it would be best to uncouple the two
37. See Fisheries Agreement, supra note 35, arts. II-XVII, anns. A-D.
38. Id. arts. Ii, IV, VII, IX, XII, XIII, XVIII, and XIX.
39. Id. arts. II-IV.
40. Id. art. IX.
41. See generally Rhee, The Application of Equitable Principles to Resolve the United
States-Canada Dispute Over East Coast Fishery Resources, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 667 (1980).
42. See Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty and East Coast Fishery Resources
Agreement: Hearings on S. Exec. Docs. U, V Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate Hearings]; Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conser-
vation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings].
43. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for discussion of its provisions.
44. See generally, H.R. SUBCOMM. ON FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 96TH CONG.. 2D SESS.,
OVERSIGHT REPORT ON THE U.S.-CANADA EAST COAST FISHERY AGREEMENT AND BOUNDARY
TREATY 18-21 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 HOUSE REP.].
Opponents of the Fisheries Agreement asserted that the entitlement for fish stocks was
generally unfair to the United States. For example, the shares for fish stocks in the
Georges Bank area (5Ze)-including scallops: Canada, 73.35%, United States, 26.65%;
cod: Canada, 17%, United States, 83%; haddock: Canada, 21%, United States, 79%; and
after 6 years, herring: Canada, 33.33%, United States, 66.67%-were unfair to the
United States because if there is a split decision in the boundary settlement, Canada
would have less than one-sixth of Georges Bank or one-eighth of the Georges Bank area
(5Ze). See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra [note 42,] at 172-73. They particularly com-
plained about the 26.65% entitlement to scallops in Georges Bank, because this share,
based on historical averages from 1965 to 1977, did not take into account U.S. scallopers'
interests in Georges Bank before 1965 and accorded too much weight to the Canadians'
interest in the Bank, which had begun only in the early 1960's. They also pointed out
that the average failed to take into account that in recent years the U.S. share had risen
from 26.9% in 1977 to 40% in 1979. See 1979 House Hearings, supra [note 42,] at 54-60
and 146. See also 1980 Senate Hearings, supra [note 42,] at 56-58 and 200-18.
Rhee, supra note 2, at 597 n.45.
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treaties and proceed with ratification of the Boundary Settlement Treaty.' 45
On March 25, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed to propose a
resolution endorsing this approach, 46 which the full Senate adopted on April
29, 1981. 47
Canada was displeased with the United States' decision to accept the
Boundary Settlement Treaty and yet to reject the Fisheries Agreement.'
The two agreements had been negotiated together and were intended to be
accepted or rejected together. Canada, which had already ratified the two
agreements, had to separately consider ratification of the Boundary Settle-
ment Treaty alone. On October 8, 1981, the Canadian Governor General
authorized the Secretary of State for External Affairs to ratify the modified
agreement. 49 Following the provisions of the Treaty, Canada and the
United States subsequently filed this case with the International Court of
Justice, asking that a Chamber of the Court delimit a single maritime
boundary dividing both the continental shelf and fisheries zones of the two
countries.5 0
III. THE BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT TREATY AND THE USE OF THE ICJ
CHAMBER
The Boundary Settlement Treaty contains four articles with two an-
nexed agreements, the Special Agreement 5 and the Arbitration Agree-
45. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
SETTLEMENT TREATY WITH CANADA, S. EXEC. REP. No. 5, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 SENATE REP.] For a concise discussion of the Fisheries Agreement
and the reasons for non-ratification, see D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 15, at 89-94.
VanderZwaag discusses ten factors which contributed to the demise of the agreement, includ-
ing the belief that the scallop allotment was unfair to the United States, the fear of a new
layer of regulations, and a willingness to gamble on a favorable decision by the ICJ on the
boundary settlement issue.
46. 1981 SENATE REP., supra note 45, at 8.
47. See Senate Approves Treaty on Sea Border with Canada, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30,
1981, at A9, cols. 1-2.
48. See Reagan Removes Canada Fishing Treaty From Senate on Eve of Trip to Ot-
tawa, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 16, cols. 1-2.
49. See McRae, Proportionality and the Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary Dispute, 19
CAN. Y.B. Irr'L L. 287, 287 (1981) [hereinafter cited as McRae, Proportionality]
50. Following this judgment, the fisheries management issues which had been worked out
in the rejected Fisheries Agreement were left unresolved and will have to be worked out be-
tween the parties at a later date. For a discussion of various ways the United States and
Canada might resolve these problems now that the boundary issue is settled, see D.
VANDERZWAAG, supra note 15, at 95-112.
51. Boundary Settlement Treaty, supra note 36, Annex I - Special Agreement between
the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada to submit to a Chamber
of the International Court of Justice The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf
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ment. 2 In Article I of the Treaty the parties agree to submit the dispute to
a Chamber of the ICJ according to the provisions of the Special Agree-
ment. Article 1I stipulates that if the Chamber has not been constituted
within six months of the entry into force of the Treaty, either party may
terminate the Special Agreement, which activates the Arbitration Agree-
ment. Article III provides that either party may terminate the Special
Agreement if a vacancy on the Chamber is not filled to its satisfaction.
Article IV contains the terms for the entry into force of the Treaty.53
The Special Agreement sets forth the procedure for submitting the dis-
pute to a Chamber. Article I of the Special Agreement states that the
Chamber shall consist of five persons chosen after consultation with the
parties, pursuant to Articles 26 and 31 of the Statute of the Court. Article
III defines the issue for the Chamber and stipulates that the parties shall
accept the decision as final and binding.5
4
As originally drafted and signed in 1979, the Treaty enabled the par-
ties to "maintain a virtually absolute veto power over the composition of the
Chamber.15 5 This was accomplished by the interaction of the provisions of
the Treaty with changes in the rules of the Court 56 made in 1972 and 1978.
In general, the changes in the rules had the effect of allowing the parties to
influence the composition of an ad hoc chamber of the Court.57 For exam-
of Maine Area [hereinafter cited as Special Agreement], Mar. 29, 1982, reprinted in Gulf of
Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 252-55.
52. Boundary Settlement Treaty, supra note 36, Annex 1I [hereinafter cited as Arbitra-
tion Agreement].
53. 1981 SENATE REP., supra note 45, at 3.
54. Id. at 3-5. Article II of the Special Agreement limits the scope of the Chamber's
decision by asking that they delimit a single boundary for both the subsoil and the water
column and by asking that the boundary begin at a designated point and end within a desig-
nated area. Article VI provides for later negotiations-and, if necessary, a binding decision by
the ICJ Chamber or a Court of Arbitration-on the seaward extension of the boundary. Id.
See supra note 3.
The Arbitration Agreement wbuld have entered into force if either party had terminated
the Special Agreement in accordance with Articles 1i and III of the Treaty. The Arbitration
Agreement is similar to the Special Agreement, except that the dispute would be submitted to
an arbitration tribunal composed of five persons mutually agreed upon by the parties, rather
than to an ICJ Chamber. Id. at 5-7.
55. Note, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and The Gulf of Maine
Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 481 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, ICJ Chambers]; Mc-
Rae, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 292-94.
56. See Rules of Court, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT, No. 4 (1978), reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L
L. 748 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Rules of Court].
57. Jim6nez de Ar6chega, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-4 (1973); S. ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
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pie, in 1972 a requirement was added that the President of the Court con-
sult with the parties on the composition of the chamber58 and inform the
Court of their preferences.5 ' The Court, however, votes by secret ballot for
the members'" and can ignore the parties' wishes. Prior to the Gulf of
Maine case, commentators felt that, in general, the Court would implement
these provisions in such a manner as to respect the parties' wishes."
The version of the Treaty which the parties first signed avoided the
risk that the Court would not constitute the Chamber according to the par-
ties' wishes. The Special Agreement originally provided that the members
of the Court would elect three of the five judges on the Chamber after
consultation with the parties, and the parties would choose two judges ad
hoc who were not nationals of either party. Article I of the Treaty stated
that the Chamber would not be deemed constituted until the parties notified
the Court of the two judges they had selected. 62 Accordingly, a party dis-
satisfied with the Court's selection of judges could choose to allow the six-
month termination period of Article II of the Treaty to pass before notify-
OF JUSTICE 38-47 (1983); Note, ICJ Chambers, supra note 55, at 476-79.
The Rules were revised to answer criticisms of the Court by making procedures more
flexible and informal and, hopefully, to make the chambers procedure authorized by Article 26
of the I.C.J. statute more attractive to potential litigants. Article 26 states that "[T]he Court
may at any time form a chamber for dealing with any particular case. The number of judges
to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the par-
ties." International Court of Justice Statute, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, at 25, 3 Bevans
1179 [hereinafter cited as ICJ Statute].
58. 1978 Rules of Court, supra note 56, art. 17, para. 2.
The language providing that the President of the Court "shall consult the agents of the
parties regarding the composition of the chamber," 1978 Rules of the Court, supra note 56,
art. 17, para. 2, was apparently:
a compromise between those who wanted to give the parties the power to decide for
themselves on the composition of the chamber and those who wished to preserve the
power of the Court to make the actual selection, and it was a matter on which the Court
itself was divided.
McRae, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 296-97 (footnotes omitted).
59. 1978 Rules of Court, supra note 56, art. 17, para 2.
60. Id. at para. 3.
61. See Note, JCJ Chambers. supra note 53, at 479; Jim6nez de Ar6chega, supra note
57, at 3. McRae, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 297. But see S. ROSENNE, supra note 57, at
44-45. Rosenne feels it may be too optimistic to expect that the Court or even a powerful
minority of the Court (Article 18 of the Rules requires a majority of the Court to elect mem-
bers of the chambers) will never use its power to block the composition of the chamber desired
by the parties.
62. The original versions of the provisions are presented in the footnotes of the Boundary
Settlement Treaty, supra note 36. These provisions are analyzed in Note, ICJ Chambers,
supra note 55, and McRae, Adjudication, supra note 2. Neither of these articles discusses the
ratified and final version of the Treaty.
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ing the Court of its choice for an ad hoc judge. The Special Agreement
would then no longer be operative and the Arbitration Agreement would be
triggered. 63 The original version of the Treaty, thus, ingeniously took ad-
vantage of the Court's provisions for formation of an ad hoc chamber, giv-
ing the parties the advantages of adjudication before the International
Court of Justice with the added benefit of a degree of control, otherwise
unavailable in that forum, over the makeup of the body which would decide
the case.
64
The United States Senate deleted the provision in the Special Agree-
ment allowing each party to select a non-national judge, apparently because
of the possibility that the original provision was not compatible with the
Statute and Rules of the ICJ.6" Because of these amendments, the Treaty
did not provide a clear escape route for the parties to withdraw the case
from the Court if they were displeased with the judges selected by the
Court for the Chamber. The parties were, however, at least guaranteed that
each would have a judge of their nationality on the Chamber, or, alterna-
tively, a judge ad hoc of their choice, on the Chamber.66
On January 20, 1982, the ICJ constituted the Chamber which would
hear the Gulf of Maine case.67 The Chamber was constituted entirely in
accordance with the wishes of the parties."
63. McRae, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 295. The Treaty as ratified still allows the
parties to withdraw if a vacancy arising in the Chamber is filled with a judge unacceptable to
either party. See supra text accompanying note 53.
64. An adjudication before the ICJ is desirable for several reasons. A decision by the ICJ
is generally regarded as more prestigious than an arbitration award. It is also less expensive
because the United Nations pays a large portion of the Court's costs. Finally, using the ICJ
promotes international law and justice or at least gives states an opportunity to appear to
promote these ideals. Note, ICJ Chambers, supra note 55, at 474-76.
65. 1981 SENATE REP., supra note 45, at 8; Note, International Adjudication, supra note
2, at 140.
The amendment states that the Chamber will be constituted in accordance with Articles
26 and 31 of the Court's Statute. Boundary Settlement Treaty, supra note 36. Technically, a
party only has the power to elect a judge if none of the members of the chamber selected by
the Court are of the party's nationality. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 31, para. 4.
On the other hand, the predominant view among commentators prior to this case was that
the Court would, in normal circumstances, elect the judges suggested by the parties. Jim6nez
de Ar6chega, supra note 57, at 3; McRae, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 297. McRae sug-
gested that the Treaty, as originally drafted, probably was not only compatible with the ICJ
Statute and Rules but was "an approach ... contemplated at the time of the revision of the
Rules of Court and anticipated by the Court itself." Id. at 295-97.
66. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 31. The parties may have had ideas for other ways to
withdraw if the chamber chosen had been unacceptable.
67. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1982 I.C.J. 4 (Constitution of Chamber Order of Jan. 20), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 69 (1982).
68. 1982 I.C.J. at 10. For final composition of the chamber, see supra note 1. All judges
1985]
150 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
The Gulf of Maine case was the first case to utilize the chambers pro-
cedure. Accordingly, it will have important implications for the future of
ICJ adjudication." Other nations may be encouraged to bring cases before
the ICJ because the parties to the Gulf of Maine case were successful in
persuading the Court to approve the composition of the chamber which
they desired. Some members of the Court did, however, voice vigorous dis-
sents against the influence over the composition of the chamber which the
parties wielded in this case. 0
In the future, the attractiveness of the chambers procedure to potential
litigants will depend upon how much weight the Court decides to give to the
preferences of the parties in selecting the judges to sit on a chamber. If the
Court gives weight to the litigants' preferences, states may be encouraged
to use the ICJ. On the other hand, the use of a regional chamber - such as
the group in this case composed entirely of western judges - could cause a
split in the law, particularly when important issues of first impression arise,
and, thus, the development of international law and respect for interna-
tional judicial proceedings could be undermined.7 '
IV. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The arguments of the parties as presented to the Chamber will be
briefly set forth.7 2 Surprisingly, the parties' formulations of the applicable
general principles of law were very similar to one another. The United
were western judges. Judge Oda, a respected scholar on law of the sea, who wrote a vigorous
and learned dissent in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case reviewing the law of maritime
boundary delimitation, was not on the Chamber.
69. For fuller discussion of the ICJ chambers procedure and the future implications of
the use of that procedure in the Gulf of Maine case, see Note, ICJ Chambers, supra note 55;
Note, International Adjudication, supra note 2.
70. 1982 I.C.J. at 11-13 (Morozov, J., and EI-Khani, J., dissenting). The dissenters ar-
gued that the parties could not formally decide and propose the names of judges to sit on the
chamber and that such a proposal was an "ultimatum" which negated the Court's sovereign
right to elect judges independently of the wishes of the parties. In addition, Judge EI-Khani
stated that selecting judges exclusively from industrialized Western states controverts the basic
and essential universality of the Court. See S. ROSENNE. supra note 57, at 45. Rosenne believes
the ICJ opinion, read with the dissents, shows some indication that the Court may determine
the composition of an ad hoc tribunal without considering exclusively the desires of the parties.
71. Note, International Adjudication, supra note 2, at 142-43. The author of the note
suggests that the Court will need to circumscribe carefully the scope of the chamber's
procedure.
72. For a more extended discussion of the arguments, see McRae, The Gulf of Maine
Case: The Written Proceedings, 21 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 266 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
Rae, Proceedings]. The synopsis of the arguments of the parties which follows is drawn from
McRae's article.
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States memorial stated the rule of law as follows: "The cardinal principle in
delimiting a single maritime boundary is that the delimitation shall be in
accordance with equitable principles, taking account of the relevant circum-
stances in the area to produce an equitable solution."'7" The Canadian me-
morial stated: "[T]here is an underlying and fundamental norm or rule of
law to be applied to all maritime boundary delimitations . . . that maritime
boundaries are to be determined in accordance with equitable principles,
takin'g account of all relevant circumstances, in order to achieve an equita-
ble result."''7 From this common beginning, however, the parties diverged to
present widely differing specific arguments for distinctly different
boundaries.
A. The Boundaries Claimed
The United States had previously claimed a line which followed the
Northeast Channel. 7 5 Before the Chamber, however, the United States
brought forward a claim to a new boundary "perpendicular to the general
direction of the coast, as adjusted to take account of relevant circumstances
of the area. ' 76 The adjustments were to avoid crossing two major fishing
banks on the Scotian Shelf-Browns Bank and German Bank.7 The United
States line therefore was "a series of lines, some perpendicular and some
parallel to the general direction of the coast, constructed to enclose the 50-
fathom depth contour and thus to avoid the fishing banks on the Scotian
Shelf."78
The Canadian line was the one claimed in 1978, 7 that is, "an equidis-
tance line on which every point is an equal distance from basepoints on the
coast of the two parties."8 0 In its "outer reaches," however, "a basepoint
located at the north end of Cape Cod Canal has been used instead of the
attenuated coastal projection of Cape Cod and the off-lying islands of Nan-
tucket and Martha's Vineyard."'" The Canadian line was therefore an equi-
distance line adjusted to take account of the special circumstances of Cape
Cod.8" (See Map 3 for the claims of the two parties.)
73. United States Memorial, para. 8.
74. Canadian Memorial, para. 278.
75. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
76. United States Memorial, para. 301.
77. Id. at 303.
78. Id. at 304.
79. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
80. Canadian Memorial, para. 6.
81. Id.
82. This adjustment in the equidistance line is justified in the Canadian Memorial on the
ground that "the elongated protrusion of Cape Cod, separated from the Massachusetts main-
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B. Canada
The Canadian position was based on several propositions. First, equita-
ble principles should be "identified and applied on the basis of applicable
law."83 Accordingly, Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf,84 to which both states are parties, "is directly relevant to the conti-
nental shelf as a component of the single maritime boundary, and it is indi-
rectly relevant by way of analogy to the boundary in its entirety,"8 5 and the
"sources of law respecting the exclusive economic zone and the 200-mile
fishing zone"" must also be considered. Second, the boundary must respect
the basis of coastal title to the area delimited. In the Canadian view, the
emergence of the exclusive economic zone represents a trend toward the
distance principle as the basis of title.87 Third, "the boundary should re-
spect the basic purposes of the rights and jurisdiction in issue. ' 'a Since the
essential purpose of the exclusive economic zone is economic, then "the eco-
nomic dependence of a coastal state upon an area of the sea adjacent to its
coasts should be given particular weight."8 9 Fourth, "the boundary should
take account of legally relevant circumstances."90 To Canada this meant
the contemporary reality of the fisheries, not its historic evolution, since the
land by the Cape Cod Canal, is indisputably an irregularity of the eastern North American
coastline, and its eastward thrust is wholly out of alignment with the general direction of the
Massachusetts coast within the Gulf of Maine." McRae, Proceedings supra note 72, at 267
n.7 (quoting Canadian Memorial, para. 346).
83. Canadian Counter-Memorial, para. 545.
84. See supra notes 19 and 23 and accompanying text. Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention in the Continental Shelf provides:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining
to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the bound-
ary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States,
the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of
each State is measured ....
85. Canadian Counter-Memorial, para. 549.
86. Id. at 229.
87. McRae, Proceedings, supra note 72, at 269.
88. Canadian Counter-Memorial, para. 558.
89. Id. at para. 580.
90. Id. at para. 545.
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former is most relevant to the purposes of the zones being delimited. 1 Fi-
nally, the result of applying these principles must be equitable, in light of
"all the relevant circumstances. ' 9"
Applying these principles, Canada made several specific arguments.
First, it was contended that equidistance was the most appropriate method
to apply. Equidistance is mentioned in the 1958 Geneva Convention,93 and
it most closely reflects proximity or the distance principle which Canada
claimed was the primary basis for title. Second, Canada contended that the
United States was aware that Canada utilized the equidistance line in issu-
ing oil and gas exploratory permits during the 1964-69 period. Because the
United States had nonetheless acquiesced to that Canadian action, it was
claimed that the United States was now estopped from protesting the use of
the equidistance principle." In addition, it was argued that the United
States and Canada had been partners in relation to the fisheries of the
Georges Bank for years, as the United States recognized in negotiating the
1979 Fisheries Agreement with Canada, and that it would be inequitable to
throw Canada out of Georges Bank now.9 In a third related argument,
Canada claimed the United States had used a modified equidistance line
itself in the 1960s and 1970s.9 The Bureau of Land Management used this
line in issuing geophysical survey permits. This, the Canadians asserted,
established a modus vivendi or de facto boundary similar to that relied on
by the Court in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case.97 Finally, the
Canadians argued that Canada has built up, in the post-World War II pe-
riod, an intensive scallop and groundfish fishery 8 and that "the fishery is
the main pillar of the southwest Nova Scotia economy, and the resources of
the Georges Bank are vital to its prosperity." 99 According to Canada, this
economic dependence should given special weight if the result is to be
equitable. 100
C. United States
The United States identified four specific "equitable principles" which
91. McRae, supra note 72, at 270.
92. Canadian Counter-Memorial, para. 545.
93. See text of Article supra note 84.
94. Canadian Memorial, para. 427.
95. Id. at para. 322.
96. Canadian Reply, para. 242.
97. Id. at para. 244.
98. Canadian Memorial, para. 190-94.
99. Id. at para. 200.
100. Id. at para. 311.
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applied. 10 1 First, "the boundary must respect the relationship between the
coasts of the parties and the maritime areas in front of those coasts.'
02
This principle encompasses three subsidiary principles: non-encroachment,
proportionality, and natural prolongation. 3 Encroachment occurs "when
the method of delimitation leaves to one State an area that is off, or in front
of, the coast of another."'" The proportionality test, which "requires that a
delimitation take account of the relationship between the extent of the mar-
itime area appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their
respective coastlines"' 105 was said to apply to a single maritime boundary
"because the rights to be delimited derive from the relationship of the areas
in question to the abutting coasts."'" Natural prolongation, a third princi-
ple derived from earlier cases delimiting the continental shelf was thought
to apply, even though it was admitted that the area was basically continu-
ous shelf, because geomorphological features like the Northeast Channel,
even where they do not divide an area into "two natural prolongations, may
nonetheless be among the relevant circumstances to be considered in deter-
mining an equitable solution.'
0 7
The second general "equitable principle" identified was that "the
boundary should facilitate conservation and management."'110 The third
such principle was that "the boundary should minimize the potential for
international disputes."' 1 9 The final "equitable principle" asserted was that
"the boundary must take account of the relevant circumstances of the
area.""10
Several specific arguments flowed from these principles. First, the
United States argued for what might be called geographical-as opposed to
geological-natural prolongation. Viewing the North American continental
coastline in the vicinity of the land boundary as a whole, the U.S. identified
a single general direction of the coast.'' Then, they concluded that the
coasts of Canada and the United States that accord with the general direc-
tion are "primary" coasts. The coast of Nova Scotia facing onto the Gulf of
Maine was said to be a "secondary" coast, because it is the only coast that
101. McRae, Proceedings, supra note 72, at 270-72.
102. United States Memorial, 140.
103. Id. at para. 239.
104. Id. at para. 240.
105. Id. at para. 242.
106. Id. at para. 244.
107. Id. at para. 246.
108. Id. at 142.
109. Id. at 143.
110. Id. at 145.
111. Id. at para. 283.
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departs radically from that general direction.112 Accordingly, the United
States argued that the Georges Bank lies off Maine and New Hampshire,
rather than off Nova Scotia to which it is more proximate. Thus, a line
equidistant from the "primary" coast of Maine and "secondary" coast of
Nova Scotia cuts off the former, but not the latter.1 '
Next, the United States argued that, despite the unity of the continen-
tal shelf, certain natural boundaries should be recognized. The Northeast
Channel is described as "a significant break in the surface of the continen-
tal shelf."' 1 4 In addition, the United States claimed that the marine envi-
ronment of the Gulf of Maine is divided into three principal ecological re-
gimes, 116 two of which, Georges Bank and the Scotian Shelf, are divided by
the Northeast Channel. Accordingly, the United States asserted that a
boundary that divided these ecological regimes and the separate stocks of
fish and shellfish within them would both facilitate conservation and man-
agement and minimize the potential for international disputes, since the
management of any one stock would not have to be divided between two
governments."16
Finally, the United States argued that it had historical rights in the
area. The United States claimed a history of United States activities in the
entire Gulf of Maine area-or at least up to the Northeast Channel-for
over 200 years. The United States took credit for mapping and surveying
the area, 1 7 for providing electronic and other aids to navigation, 118 for sci-
entific research,'1 9 for search and rescue,'2 0 and for defense. 12 1 These activi-
ties were said to demonstrate the predominant interest of the United States.
The intensification of Canadian fishing in the area over the last few decades
was said to be too recent to establish historical rights. The United States
also denied that Nova Scotia was economically dependent on the Georges
Bank and asserted that such dependence would not be legally relevant if it
existed. 122
In sum, the parties presented a number of arguments, which were com-
plex and varied, and produced thousands of pages of briefs, annexes and
112. Id. at para. 287.
113. McRae, Proceedings, supra note 72, at 275.
114. United States Memorial, para. 30.
115. Id. at para. 38.
116. McRae, Proceedings, supra note 72, at 276.
117. United States Memorial, paras. 104-13.
118. Id. at paras. 114-20.
119. Id. at paras. 121-28.
120. Id. at paras. 129-30.
121. Id. at paras. 131-32.
122. United States Counter-Memorial paras. 187-90 and paras. 340-48.
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technical reports. The Chamber, however, rejected all the arguments of the
parties in its decision.
V. THE JUDGMENT
A. The Special Agreement-What Did the Parties Ask the Chamber to
Decide?
The parties requested in Article II of the Special Agreement that the
Chamber:
decide, in accordance with the principles and rules of international law
applicable in the matter between the parties, the following question:
What is the course of the single maritime boundary that divides
the continental shelf and fisheries zones of Canada and the United
States of America from a point in latitude 44 1 'l 2"N, longitude 67*
16'46"W to a point to be determined by the Chamber within an area
bounded by straight lines connecting the following sets of geographic
coordinates: latitude 40 N, longitude 67 °W; latitude 40 N, longitude
65"W; latitude 42"N, longitude 65 ° W?
The point of commencement of the boundary has been designated by the
parties as Point A, and the area within the stipulated coordinates in which
the Court is to terminate the boundary forms a triangle. (See Map 1 for the
locations of Point A and the triangle.)
In the first part of the decision the Court sets forth the limits placed on
it by the parties and accepts them.123
B. Description of the Gulf of Maine Area
In the second part of the judgment, the Court extensively describes the
Gulf of Maine area and rejects certain factual contentions of the parties
regarding it. First, the geography of the area is described. 24 In the course
of the description the Court rejects the United States' distinction between
primary and secondary coasts'2 6 and Canada's discounting of Cape Cod in
constructing its modified equidistance line.1"6 Second, the Chamber de-
scribes the geology of the seabed in the area,'2 7 concluding that there is one
123. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 263-67 (paras. 14-27). See supra note 3.
124. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 268-73 (paras. 29-42).
125. Id. at 271 (para. 36).
126. Id. at 271 (para. 37).
127. Id. at 273-75 (paras. 44-47).
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continuous continental shelf in the area and rejecting the contention of the
United States that the Northeast Channel is a significant division in that
shelf." 8 Third, the Chamber describes the ecology and stocks of fish and
shellfish in the area, considers the claim of the United States that there are
"natural boundaries" in the water column 29 , and concludes that the water
column in the area is one continuous mass 13 -in fact, doubting that there
could ever be "natural boundaries" in "so fluctuating an environment as the
waters of the ocean." 13 1 Finally, the Chamber summarizes Canadian and
United States claims of historical rights in, and economic dependence on,
the fisheries in the area," 2 and concludes that these matters are not directly
relevant, saying that:
The Chamber is . . .convinced that for the purposes of such a
delimitation operation as is here required, international law, as will be
shown below, does no more than lay down in general that equitable
criteria are to be applied, criteria which are not spelled out but which
are essentially to be determined in relation to what may be properly
called the geographical features of the area. It will only be when the
Chamber has . . .[tentatively drawn] a delimitation line, that it may
and should . ..bring in other criteria which may also be taken into
account in order to be sure of reaching an equitable result.
3
This quotation provides an excellent preview of the process followed by the
Court in reaching its result.
The third part of the decision details at length the history of the dis-
pute and describes the boundary lines claimed by each of the parties.'34
C. Definition of the Fundamental Norm of Customary International
Law Governing Maritime Delimitation
In the fourth part of the judgment, the Chamber reviews the general
principles of customary international law applicable in the case.'36 The
Chamber distinguishes such general principles from the various equitable
criteria and practical methods that may be used in applying such principles.
128. Id. at 275 (para. 47).
129. Id. at 275-77 (paras. 48-55).
130. Id. at 277 (para. 55).
131. Id. at 277 (para. 54).
132. Id. at 278 (paras. 57, 58).
133. Id. at 278 (para. 59).
134. Id. at 278-88 (paras. 60-78).
135. Id. at 288-302 (paras. 79-112).
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Such criteria and methods can only be determined in relation to each par-
ticular case and thus cannot rise to the level of a rule of customary law. 3 "
The Chamber also distinguishes special international law, bilateral and
multilateral, which may apply between particular parties due to a treaty or
principles of estoppel.13
7
Then, the Chamber briefly identifies several potential sources of law
and extracts general principles from them. First, the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf is considered.'3 8 The Chamber states that the provi-
sions relating to equidistance and special circumstances are only equitable
criteria and practical methods and, as such, are not customary international
law. However, the Chamber does extract a general principle requiring good
faith negotiation toward an agreement.
Next, the Chamber reviews the cases: the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, the Anglo-French Continental Shelf arbitration, and the Tunisial
Libya Continental Shelf case. All of the cases stress the two concepts of
mutual agreement, where possible, and decision in accordance with equita-
ble principles."3 9
The last source considered is the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea. 40 The Chamber admits that the Convention has not entered into force
but states that this "cannot invalidate the observation that certain provi-
sions of the convention concerning the continental shelf and the'exclusive
economic zone, which may, in fact, be relevant to the present case, were
adopted without any objections."'4 The Chamber then goes on to discuss
Articles 74 and 83142 relating to delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf. The Chamber notes that these provisions are
"limited to expressing the need for settlement of the problem by agreement
and recalling the obligation to achieve an equitable solution" and that the
same language is employed in each article. 43
136. Id. at 290 (para. 81).
137. Id. at 290 (para. 82).
138. Id. at 291-92 (paras. 84-90). For text of Article 6 of the Convention, see supra note
84.
139. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf arbitration court states that "failing agree-
ment, the boundary between States abutting on the same continental shelf is to be determined
on equitable principles." 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 45, 54 I.L.R. at 55 (para. 70). See Feld-
man, supra note 8, at 219.
140. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A.CONF. 62/122, reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) and in The Law of the Sea (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea].
141. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 294 (para. 94).
142. For the text of the delimitation provisions in Articles 74 and 83, see infra text fol-
lowing note 186.
143. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 294-95 (paras. 9S-96). For discussion of reasons the
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Next, the Chamber refers to the parties' arguments."" It accepts their
virtually identical statements of the applicable fundamental norm and re-
jects the more specific equitable principles suggested by the parties1 " as not
rising to the level of customary international law.
Part four ends with the Chambers' reformulation of the general inter-
national law applicable in every maritime delimitation between neighboring
states:
(1) No maritime delimitation between states with opposite or adja-
cent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such
delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement,
following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine
intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agree-
ment cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to
a third party possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application
of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of
ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and
other relevent circumstances, an equitable result." '
D. Determination of Whether Any Special International Law Applies
Specifically Between These Parties
Having determined that the only applicable general customary interna-
tional law is the above-stated rather broad and indefinite "fundamental
norm," the Chamber goes on to examine possible sources of obligation be-
tween these particular parties. '4 Under this heading the Chamber rejects
many of the most important arguments of the parties. The Chamber begins
by asking whether any treaties or conventions apply in this case, particu-
larly the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 4 ' After a protracted
discussion the Chamber concludes that the equidistance/special circum-
stances delimitation method prescribed in the Convention is not a general
Chamber may be in error in extracting a norm of customary law from these provisions, see
infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
144. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 295-99 (paras. 97-111).
145. For a discussion of the competing claims of the United States and Canada, see
supra text accompanying notes 72-122.
146. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 299 (para. 112).
147. Id. at 300-15 (paras. 113-63).
148. Id. at 301 (para. 116).
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norm of customary law."' Further, they conclude that, although it is ad-
mittedly in force between the parties, the convention does not apply because
the delimitation at issue involves fisheries zones and the continental shelf
rather than the latter alone.'8 0
Next, the Chamber considers whether the conduct of the parties has
raised any obligations between them affecting this case.' Canada's argu-
ments of acquiescience by the United States in the equidistance line and
resulting estoppel are rejected'"2 because "the conduct of the United States,
because of its unclear nature, does not satisfy the conditions prescribed in
the 1969 [North Sea] Judgment, either for estoppel or for acquiescence. "153
Canada's modus vivendi argument is also rejected on the ground that 1965
to 1972 is too short a time in which to establish a de facto boundary." 4
E. Choice of Equitable Criteria and Practical Delimitation
Methods to be Used
The Chamber asserts, in effect, that there are no limits on the criteria
and methods which it may use in any particular case. The Chamber does
list several equitable criteria'5 5 and several delimitation methods 56 which
have been used in the past. It refuses to undertake, however, a complete
listing or evaluation of these criteria and methods in the abstract, saying:
[T]heir equitableness or otherwise can only be assessed in relation
to the circumstances of each case, and for one and the same criterion it
is quite possible to arrive at different, or even opposite, conclusions in
different cases. The essential fact to bear in mind is, as the Chamber
has stressed, that the criteria in question are not themselves rules of
law and therefore mandatory in the different situations, but "equita-
ble", or even "reasonable", criteria, and that what international law
requires is that recourse be had in each case to the criterion, or the
balance of different criteria, appearing to be most appropriate to the
concrete situation.
1 5 7
149. Id. at 303 (para. 124).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 303-12 (paras. 126-54).
152. Id. at 303-10 (paras. 126-48). For a summary of these arguments, see supra text
accompanying notes 94-95.
153. Id. at 309 (para. 145).
154. Id. at 310-11 (paras. 149-51).
155. Id. at 312-13 (para. 157).
156. Id. at 313-14 (para. 159).
157. Id. at 313 (para. 158).
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Having established virtual total judicial discretion in the choice of eq-
uitable criteria and delimitation methods, the Chamber considers and re-
jects the lines proposed by both the parties.158 The United States' reliance
on "natural boundaries" in the water column is inappropriate because it is
relevant only to delimitation of the fisheries zone, not the continental
shelf.'8 9 The United States' use of a perpendicular to the general direction
of the coast is inappropriate because the coast is too irregular.6 0 The Cana-
dian equidistance line, if used, would have to be corrected for proportional-
ity-or the respective lengths of the parties' coastlines in the area,' 6' but is
probably inappropriate anyway because the use of that method is designed
for adjacent states and the Canadian and United States coasts are more
nearly opposite in certain parts of the area to be delimited.'6 2
Having rejected the lines proposed by the parties, the Chamber pro-
ceeds to the heart of the decision-its determination of the equitable crite-
ria and practical delimitation methods to apply and the actual construction
of the delimitation line. The Court first makes a preliminary decision, stat-
ing that:
[A] delimitation which has to apply at one and the same time to
the continental shelf and to the superadjacent water column can only
be carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of crite-
ria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of these two ob-
jects to the detriment of the other, and, at the same time, is such as to
be equally suitable to the division of either of them. 16s
The Chamber then determines summarily that the kind of criteria which fit
that description are geographical criteria and that "within [that] frame-
work, it is inevitable" that the Chamber's main criterion would be that
"one should aim at an equal division of areas where the maritime projec-
tions of the coasts of the States . ..converge and overlap."" 4
The Chamber then states that the situation in this case requires that
the application of this base criterion must be adjusted to correct for the
effects of three "auxiliary criteria"-specifically the difference between the
respective lengths of the countries' coastlines in the area (proportionality),
the desirability of avoiding cutting off coastlines from their appropriate pro-
158. Id. at 316-25 (paras. 164-89).
159. Id. at 316-17 (paras. 166-68).
160. Id. at 317-20 (paras. 169-77).
161. Id. at 322-23 (paras. 184-85).
162. Id. at 323-25 (paras. 186-89).
163. Id. at 327 (para. 194).
164. Id. at 327 (para. 195).
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jections (non-encroachment), and the necessity of giving some effect, al-
though not necessarily full effect, to islands or groups of small islands lying
off a coast.1 65
F. The Delimitation
Next, the Chamber discusses the actual line to be constructed and the
methods to be used in constructing it. It decides that the line in the Gulf
must be in two segments to reflect the change in orientation of the coasts
from adjacency to oppositeness. 1" The first segment must begin at Point A,
chosen by the parties. The Chamber states that in this part of the boundary
the basic criterion of equal division of areas of overlap should be effected as
far as possible, and it claims that no special circumstances require consider-
ation of the auxiliary criteria in this segment.1 61 An equidistance line would
seem to implement that basic criterion; it is impossible to construct one,
however, that goes through Point A. Also, an equidistance line might over-
emphasize minor islets and low tide elevations which might serve as base-
points. In addition, there is a dispute over the sovereignty of Machias Is-
land, which should form a basepoint for one of the parties. 168 Accordingly,
the Chamber decides not to use equidistance. Instead, two lines are drawn
from Point A perpendicular to the basic coastal lines relevant to this seg-
ment of the line. The boundary line's first segment is the bisector of the
angle formed by those two lines and it approximates an equidistance line.169
(See Map 4.) The first segment will end where it intersects the second
segment.
The second segment delimits a boundary between opposite coasts. The
Chamber finds that a median line best accomplishes an equal division of
overlapping areas. It decides not to use a median line constructed from
basepoints, however, and instead constructs a median approximately paral-
lel to the approximately parallel lines of the two opposite coasts.1 7 0 In con-
structing this segment, it is decided that the line requires adjustment.17 1
The Chamber calculates the respective lengths of the coastlines of Canada
and the United States in the relevant area. It counts the coasts of the Bay
of Fundy only where that Canadian bay is wider than 24 miles-and thus
contains water beyond the territorial waters. On this basis the Chamber
165. Id. at 327-28 (para. 196).
166. Id. at 331 (paras. 206-07).
167. Id. at 331-32 (para. 209).
168. Id. at 332-33 (paras. 210-22).
169. Id. at 333 (para. 213).
170. Id. at 333-34 (para. 216).
171. Id. at 334-35 (paras. 217-19).
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determines that the coastline of the United States in the area is 1.38 times
that of Canada.1 7 2 Accordingly, the median line previously constructed
should be moved back towards the coast of Nova Scotia, along a line be-
tween the closest points of the United States coast and the coast of Nova
Scotia to adjust for "proportionality." In addition, the Chamber decides to
adjust for another "auxiliary criterion." Seal Island, off the coast of Nova
Scotia, should, they conclude, be given half-effect. Thus, the ratio of U.S.
coastline to Canadian is adjusted from 1.38:1 to 1.32:1.173 Therefore, the
second segment will be this adjusted median line, from the point where it
intersects the first segment outward. (See Map 4.)
The third and longest segment passes through the Georges Bank. It
begins at the imaginary "closing line" of the Gulf which the Court has
constructed crossing from the easternmost tip of Nova Scotia to the United
States coast. The Chamber asserts that this segment must depend upon the
previous ones and that the most appropriate method is to construct a per-
pendicular to the "closing line" of the Gulf.174 The Chamber gives virtually
no reason for this decision. Then, it states that the starting point of that
perpendicular must be the point where the second segment-constructed
with reference to the configuration of the coasts-intersects the closing line
of the Gulf because "the land dominates the sea."' 175 Actually, this third
line looks virtually identical to the continuation east of the second segment.
(See Map 4 for the line constructed by the Chamber.)
G. Consideration of Socio-Economic Factors
In the last part of the judgment, 7 6 the Court evaluates the line it has
constructed to determine whether it is equitable "in light of all the circum-
stances which may be taken into account for purposes of that decision.
'
"177
The Chamber again reviews the claims of historical rights and economic
dependence, deciding that these considerations do not render the line ineq-
uitable. In fact, the Chamber states that "nothing less than a decision
which would have assigned the whole of Georges Bank to one of the Parties
might possibly have entailed serious economic repercussions for the
other. ' 178 The Chamber therefore approves of the line which it has con-
structed, in its judicial discretion, and sees no necessity for adjusting it in
172. Id. at 335-37 (paras. 221-22).
173. Id. at 336-37 (para. 222).
174. Id. at 337-38 (para. 224).
175. Id. at 338 (para. 226).
176. Id. at 339-44 (paras. 230-41).
177. Id. at 339-40 (para. 230).
178. Id. at 343 (para. 238).
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light of socio-economic factors.
VI. COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
A. The Role of Equitable Principles
A major legal controversy in the area of maritime boundary delimita-
tion focuses on the role of equitable principles. 17 9 In one view, the general
principles of equity should be supplemented by more specific legal rules.180
In the other view, the only rule should be that "equitable principles" apply
and the choice of principles to be applied and delimitation methods to be
used should be completely within the discretion of the decisionmaker.' 8'
The Gulf of Maine judgment supports the latter position, asserting that a
broad fundamental norm of equity is the only applicable principle of cus-
tomary international law.'
The Chamber relies, among other things, on the provisions of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the delimitation of the exclu-
sive economic zone and the continental shelf. The Chamber states that
"these provisions, even if in some respects they bear the mark of the com-
promise surrounding their adoption, may nevertheless be regarded as conso-
nant at present with general international law on the question."' 83 The
Chamber apparently bases this opinion on its characterization of these pro-
visions as having been adopted "without any objections."', This characteri-
zation is misleading.
In reality, the question of delimitation of maritime boundaries in the
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone between opposite and ad-
jacent states was one of the most intractable, hard-core issues in the entire
proceedings. 18 A battle was fought repeatedly between two groups, those
179. Commentators agree that equitable principles are part of the general principles of
international law. See infra note 233.
180. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 385-86 (para. 41) (Gros, J., dissenting); Tunisial
Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 156 (para. 24), 157 (para. 1) (Gros, J., and Oda, J.,
dissenting): Blecher, Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 88
(1970); Charney, Ocean Boundaries. supra note 2, at 600; Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at
6-11.
181. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 278, 313 (paras. 59, 158); Tunisia/Libya Continental
Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 92 (para. 133(A)(1)). See supra note 8.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37 and 156-57.
183. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 295 (para. 94).
184. Id.
185. Brown, Delimitation of Offshore Areas: Hard Labour and Bitter Fruits at UNCLOS
111, 1981 MARINE POL'Y 172, 179-80 (reporting on the work of the Ninth Session).
Negotiations were conducted in a 20-member body called Consultations on Delimita-
tion, composed of equal numbers of states from the two opposing groups, the 'equidis-
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favoring an "equidistance" formulation and those favoring a more general
"equitable principles" formulation. Finally, in the last days of the 10th Ses-
sion, the President of the Conference proposed an entirely new formula of
Article 74, paragraph 1, and Article 83, paragraph 1, which mentioned
neither the word "equidistance," nor the words "equitable principles," and,
thus, because the proposal avoided using the formulations advocated by ei-
ther group, it was eventually accepted as a compromise solution by both.
186
The 1982 Convention finally provided that:
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf]
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve
an equitable solution. 8
In light of the controversy surrounding these provisions, it cannot be as-
sumed that acceptance by consensus of this provision as a compromise and
as part of the package of the total 1982 Law of the Sea Convention means
that the provision has passed into general customary international law
which would be binding outside the context of delimitations by parties be-
tween whom the Convention is in force.' 88
tance' group headed by Spain, and the 'equitable principles' group, headed by Ireland.
The task was to reach a compromise between the following formulae favoured by the 24-
member 'equidistance' group and the 30-member 'equitable principles' group respectively:
Formula favoured by equidistance group
The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf between
adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement employing, as a general
principle, the median or equidistance line, taking into account any special circum-
stances where this is justified.
Formula favoured by equitable principles group
The delimitation of-the exclusive economic zone between adjacent or/and oppo-
site States shall be effected by agreement, in accordance with equitable principles
taking into account all relevant circumstances and employing any methods, where
appropriate, to lead to an equitable solution.
The difficulty of agreement on any one text as a basis for the negotiations was
avoided by focusing the debate on the elements of the problem rather than on any partic-
ular formula.
Id. at 180.
186. Evensen, The Delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves
as Highlighted by the International Court of Justice, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 107, 117
(C.J. Rozakis & C.A. Stephanou eds. 1983).
187. 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 140, arts. 74 and 83.
188. The 1982 Convention will enter into force 12 months after it has been ratified or
acceded to by 60 states. Ma, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East
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A stronger basis for the Chamber's decision not to explicitly formulate
more specific rules is the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf judgment.
That case is the latest of the three landmark cases on the delimitation of
continental shelf maritime boundaries between opposite and adjacent
states.1 89 The Court in that case expressly stated that the result should
dominate the decision, 190 and that the equitable principles to be applied in
each case must be selected according to their appropriateness for reaching
an equitable result.191
The dissenting judges 92 and commentators, such as Jonathan Char-
ney, criticized the judgment in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case as
verging on an unauthorized determination ex aequo et bono and as provid-
ing little guidance for the delimitation of maritime boundaries in other dis-
putes.193 These critics felt that more specific principles should be formu-
lated. In fact, some commentators contend that more specific rules and
principles of customary international law concerning maritime boundaries
already exist and that these rules and principles are applicable to single
maritime boundary delimitations. '"
Judge Gros, in his dissent to the Gulf of Maine case, criticizes it as
being, like the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, very nearly a decision
ex aequo et bono, saying that "what is today called equitable, as in the
1982 Judgment, is no longer a decision based on law but an appraisal of the
China Sea, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. No. 3, at 107
(1984). It is unlikely that the convention will enter into force between the parties. The United
States has not signed the convention, and it appears that the Reagan Administration does not
intend to sign or ratify it.
189. The others are the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the Anglo-French Conti-
nental Shelf arbitration.
190. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, 1982 I.C.J. at 59-60 (para. 70).
191. Id.
192. Judges Oda, Evensen, & Jim6nez de Ar6chega.
193. Charney, Ocean Boundaries, supra note 2, at 583-85, and other sources cited in
notes 12 and 180. See Ma, supra note 188, at 111-12. For a discussion of the distinction
between a decision ex aequo et bono and the application of equitable principles as part of
international law, see infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
194. See Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 12-14. Collins and Rogoff survey state prac-
tice in negotiating single multi-purpose maritime boundaries and analyze decisional law. They
conclude that primacy must be given to geographic factors, and that non-geographic factors
play a subsidiary role and may justify slight variances from a line determined by geographic
factors in exceptional situations. They also find strong support for the use of an equidistance
line adjusted, if necessary, to reflect proportionality, to give effect to geographic factors. See
infra notes 244 and 249. See also Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, (Oda, J., dissenting);
Blecher, supra note 180; Ma, supra note 188, at 109-10; Rhee, Equitable Solutions, supra
note 2. Cf. Charney, Ocean Boundaries, supra note 2, at 597, which suggests a five-step factor
analysis. See infra note 242.
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expediency of a result, which is the very definition of the arbitrary if no
element of control is conceivable." 19
The Chamber claims complete discretion to determine the equitable
criteria and delimitation methods to be used, with the only limit being that
those chosen must be "capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic
configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable re-
sult." 196 Critics of the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case who hoped
that the next significant maritime boundary delimitation case would begin
to develop more explicit specific rules of applicable law will be disappointed
with the result in this case.
B. The Gulf of Maine Case as Precedent
Because this is the first case delimiting a single maritime boundary for
both the continental shelf and the fisheries zone-and by extension has im-
plications for delimitations involving the exclusive economic zone-the most
important question to ask is what guidance it provides for the delimitation
of such boundaries in other disputes.197 That question must be answered on
two levels. In theory, this decision, like the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf
case, provides little or no guidance for parties to such disputes. The Cham-
ber claims that decisions in this area of the law depend upon the particular
facts of each case and that there are no transferable rules beyond a general
requirement of the application of equitable criteria and the utilization of
practical methods capable of implementing them.1 9s In practice, however,
195. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 382-83 (para. 38) (Gros, J., dissenting).
196. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 300 (para. 112(2)).
197. As of 1978, it was estimated that if 200-mile resource zones became universal, 331
maritime boundaries would have to be delimited. At that time there were over 70 disputed
boundaries and over 240 that either had not undergone negotiation, were in the process of
negotiation, or were disputed. Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 10 n.32 (citing Hodgson,
International Oceans Boundary Disputes, I OCEANS POL'Y STUD. No. 4, 37, 38 (1978)).
198. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 278, 313 (paras. 59, 158).
It must also be remembered that international courts do not follow the strict common law
doctrine of stare decisis. The ICJ "has not committed itself to the view that it is bound to
follow its previous decisions even in cases in which it later disagrees with them." H. LAUTER-
PACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 13
(1958). In fact, judicial decisions are listed as a subsidiary, not primary, source of law in the
ICJ Statute, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 38, para. 1. In practice, however, the
ICJ often relies upon and follows its previous decisions. Lauterpacht states that the general
rule is the constant and normal operation of precedent in the jurisprudence of the Court. H.
LAUTERPACHT, supra at 20. For an extended discussion of the ICJ's use of precedent and its
role in the development of international law, see id. at 3.
Under Article 27 of the ICJ Statute, a judgment given by a Chamber "shall be consid-
ered as rendered by the Court." Therefore, its impact on the development of international law
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the Chamber does offer a decision which may apply to the entire class of
cases delimiting single maritime boundaries for the continental shelf and
the fisheries zone. Specifically, the Chamber states that only geographic cri-
teria should be considered in the initial delimitation of such boundaries,
uses approximations to an equidistance line, applies proportionality directly
as one geographic criterion, and considers non-geographic criteria in deter-
mining whether a boundary line already constructed is "intrinsically
equitable."
1. Geographic Criteria
First, the Chamber states that such decisions "can only be carried out"
by the application of criteria equally suitable to the division of the subsoil
and the water column and decides that only geographic criteria fit that
description."1 9 Also, in formulating its fundamental norm of equity, the
Chamber includes the phrase "with regard to the geographic configuration
of the area and other relevant circumstances."' 0 0 (Emphasis added.) The
language used strongly suggests that it is setting up a rule to apply in fu-
ture cases, not merely deciding that geographic criteria are the most appro-
priate in this particular case. It is, of course, much simpler to limit such
decisions to consideration of geographic criteria. It is also less expensive.2 '
The United States and Canada produced thousands of pages of memorials,
technical reports and annexes in presenting complex factual arguments. 2
Smaller countries could not afford to devote such large amounts of money
and manpower to the resolution of one dispute. In light of the combination
of language suggesting strong precedential value and the practicality of lim-
iting the criteria considered, this judgment is likely to be read as setting
forth a rule that only geographic criteria will be considered in the initial
delimitation of maritime boundaries for both the subsoil and the water
column.2 0 3
should be the same.
199. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 327 (para. 194).
200. Id. at 300 (para. 112(2)).
201. See text preceding note 73 in Chiu, Some Problems Concerning the Application of
the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea Between Adjacent or Opposite States, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1
(1985).
202. They submitted approximately 7,600 pages of pleadings and 2,000 pages of oral
arguments supplemented by 300 supporting maps, sketches, or diagrams. More than 12 meters
of shelving is taken up by the volumes deposited in the ICJ Library by the parties. Gulf of
Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 360 (para. 2) (Gros, J., dissenting).
203. In addition, commentators have supported the idea that the delimitation of a single
maritime boundary for the EEZ and the continental shelf should be based primarily on geo-
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2. Equidistance
The Chamber clearly holds that the equidistance principle is not part
of general customary international law.2 ' In addition, although the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf is in force between the parties, the
Chamber decides that it does not apply because the continental shelf and
the fisheries zone-not the continental shelf alone-are being delimited.2 0 5
Therefore, the Chamber is not required to use or even to consider using the
equidistance method in its delimitation.
The Chamber does, however, use approximations to the equidistance
method in constructing the boundary. The Chamber chooses as its basic
criterion one:
long held to be as equitable as it is simple, namely that . . . having
regard to the special circumstances of the case, one should aim at an
equal division of areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of
the States between which delimitation is to be effected converge and
overlap. 00
The Chamber had earlier stated that the equidistance method is inspired by
and derived from this same criterion. 207
In constructing the first segment of the boundary, the Chamber consid-
ers using a lateral equidistance line, but rejects this method for various rea-
sons.2 08 The method the Chamber does use, however, that is, constructing a
bisector to the angle formed by the general directions of the two coasts, 20 9
closely approximates an equidistance line. (See Map 5. The first segment of
the ICJ line is almost identical to the equidistance line claimed by the
Canadians.)
graphical factors. See supra note 194 and infra note 244; Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at
51.
204. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 300 (para. 114). But see Collins & Rogoff, supra note
2, at 24, 51-54 and other sources cited supra note 194. Collins and Rogoff find equidistance is
part of customary international law. See supra note 194.
205. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 301-03 (paras. 116-25).
206. Id. at 327 (para. 195).
207. Id. at 300 (para. 115).
208. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
209. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 333 (para. 213).
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In constructing the second segment of the boundary, the Chamber
starts with an approximate median line which is then adjusted."' Although
the median line used is not constructed from basepoints, it is an approxima-
tion to an equidistance line. Because the Chamber emphasizes the equitable
criterion of equal division of areas of overlap and uses approximations to
the equidistance method to implement its delimitation, this judgment may
be read as encouraging the use of lateral and median equidistance lines
despite its insistence that the equidistance method is neither required nor
preferred over other methods.2 1
3. Proportionality
Another aspect of the decision which may have precedential value is
the use of proportionality. Having decided to focus on geographic criteria,
the Chamber was operating on familiar ground. One of the "auxiliary" geo-
graphic criteria which is applied by the Chamber is that "a fair measure of
weight should be given to a by no means negligible difference within the
delimitation area between the lengths of the respective coastlines of the
countries concerned. 2 12 This factor, known as proportionality, has been
dealt with differently in all three of the primary continental shelf delimita-
tion cases.2 13
Proportionality was recognized as relevant in the 1969 North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf cases. The North Sea Court emphasized that it referred only
to "a reasonable degree of proportionality. 2 1 4
In the 1977 Anglo/French Continental Shelf arbitration, the tribunal
recognized that proportionality should be considered in determining
whether a given boundary line was equitable; but stressed that it is not a
210. Id. at 333-37 (paras. 214-23). This line is adjusted to allow for the difference in the
lengths of the coastal fronts of the parties in the delimitation area (proportionality) and to
discount the effect of Seal Island. Id.
211. Judge Gros criticizes this judgment and the 1982 judgment in the Tunisia/Libya
Continental Shelf case as giving too little importance to the equidistance method. 1984 I.C.J.
at 387-88 (para. 46) (Gros, J., dissenting). He applies the equidistance method directly in
constructing the boundary he recommends. Id. at 386-87 (paras. 42-45).
Professor Hungdah Chiu interprets the Gulf of Maine judgment as suggesting the use of
median or equidistance lines in multipurpose delimitation cases. See text preceding note 73 in
Chiu, supra note 201.
212. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 327-28 (para. 196).
213. The discussion of the history of proportionality is drawn from Evensen, supra note
186, at 132-35, and McRae, Proportionality. supra note 49. See Ma, supra note 188, at 158-
63.
214. Evensen, supra note 186, at 133 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J.
at 52 (para. 98)).
[Vol. 9
GULF OF MAINE DELIMITATION
"general principle providing an independent source of rights to areas of
Continental Shelf. '"18 Some commentators welcome this restrictive treat-
ment of proportionality;2 16 others have argued against the tribunal's rejec-
tion of the "concept of proportionality as a general principle.
211 7
In the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case it seems that the Court
attached greater importance to proportionality than in the previous cases. 1
The Court tested the equitableness of the line it had constructed against a
mathematical ratio of proportionality, practically elevating proportionality
to the status of a principle of international law.2 19
The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case has gone even further towards
elevating the status of proportionality. Proportionality is characterized as
an "auxiliary equitable criterion" which is applicable to the present case
but which is not a principle of general international law. No doubt aware of
the controversy surrounding the evolution of proportionality, the Chamber
defensively claims that it "in no way intends to make an autonomous crite-
rion or method of delimitation out of the concept of 'proportionality.' "22
The Chamber did, however, apply a mathematical formula based on pro-
215. More specifically, the tribunal observed that:
[I]t is disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality which is
the relevant criterion .... The equitable delimitation of the Continental Shelf is not...
a question of apportioning .. the .. shelf amongst the states abutting upon it, nor is
it a question of simply assigning to them areas of the shelf in proportion to their coast-
line, for to do this would be to substitute for the delimitation of boundaries a distributive
apportionment of shares.
Based on this observation, the Court concluded:
Proportionality, therefore, is to be used as a criterion or facts relevant in evaluating
the equities of certain geographical situations, not as a general principle providing an
independent source of rights to areas of continental shelf
Evensen, supra 186, at 134 (quoting approvingly Anglo-French arbitration, 18 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards at 58, 541 I.L.R. at 67-68 (para. 101)) (emphasis in original).
216. McRae, Proportionality, supra note 49, at 297-301. See Bowett, The Arbitration
Between the United Kingdom and France Concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary in the
English Channel and Southwestern Approaches, 49 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1978); Evensen,
supra note 186, at 132-35.
217. Blecher, supra note 180, at 73-77. See also Rhee, Equitable Solutions. supra note
2, at 619.
218. The Court calculated mathematical ratios for the respective lengths of the coastlines
of the two countries in the area being delimited and compared them to the portions of the
continental shelf which each country received. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, 1982
I.C.J. at 91 (para. 131). But see Feldman, supra note 8, at 232.
219. See 1982 I.C.J. at 91 (paras. 130-31). Evensen says that the Court almost elevates
the proportionality test to the status of a principle of international law and also for the first
time applies it as a mathematical formula which is, in his opinion, "another unfortunate devel-
opment." Evensen, supra note 186, at 135.
220. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 334-35 (para. 218).
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portionality in its initial delimitation of the boundary line.
The Chamber has, in the face of the Anglo-French Continental Shelf
arbitration, used proportionality as an independent source of rights. The
Chamber has clearly taken the position that proportionality need not be
relegated to consideration as a rough indicator of equitableness as suggested
by the Anglo-French Continental Shelf arbitration, but that it may, when
appropriate, be directly applied as an independent source of rights. Having
clearly taken a position in the controversy, however, the Chamber uses lan-
guage which implies that it has, in fact, not changed the law. Once again,
the Chamber avoids explaining the reasons for its conclusions. In fact, the
legal controversy surrounding the issue of proportionality is not even
mentioned.
4. Equitable Evaluation of the Line Constructed
Finally, the Chamber continued the practice established in the Tuni-
sia/Libya Continental Shelf case of evaluating the line it has constructed
for inequity. While the Tunisia/Libya Court considered proportionality as
the litmus test in making its final determination,221 here the Chamber con-
sidered socio-economic factors. 222 The judgment states that the line it has
drawn by applying geographic criteria must be evaluated to determine
whether it is "intrinsically equitable in light of all the circumstances which
may be taken into account for purposes of that decision."22 3 The Chamber
then reconsiders the "historical rights" and "economic dependence" factors
raised by the parties and decides that they do not make the Chamber's line
inequitable, stating that "nothing less than a decision which would have
assigned the whole of Georges Bank to one of the Parties might possibly
have entailed serious economic repercussions for the other. 2 24
The Chamber implies that non-geographic factors may, in exceptional
circumstances, justify some adjustment to a line initially determined by ref-
erence solely to geographic criteria. Although the Chamber here considered
only socio-economic factors in determining whether an adjustment was jus-
tified, the broad language used can easily be read to allow a court to con-
sider any non-geographic criteria it finds significant in making this determi-
nation. The Chamber makes it clear, however, that an adjustment will not
be justified unless the boundary drawn is found to be grossly inequitable.121
221. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 91 (paras. 130-31).
222. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
223. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 339-40 (para. 230).
224. Id. at 343 (para. 238).
225. The Chamber suggests that a boundary assigning the whole of the Georges Bank to
one of the parties might have been sufficiently economically inequitable to justify such an
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C. The Reasoning of the Chamber
1. Necessity for a Reasoned Opinion
The greatest weakness in the Chamber's opinion is its failure to care-
fully explain the reasoning behind the conclusions it reaches. This problem
is evident in the Chamber's choice of which equitable criteria to apply, its
implementation of those criteria in delimiting the boundary, and its final
determination that non-geographic criteria do not render the line chosen
intrinsically inequitable. Courts have an obligation to fully elaborate their
reasoning, step by step."2 Providing such reasoning serves several purposes.
First, it creates a check on arbitrary decision-making because it provides a
basis for criticism by scholars, the bar, and the international community.
2 7
Second, it establishes greater certainty, making it easier to understand what
the law is and to predict what the court will do in analogous situations. 22 8
adjustment. Id.
226. H. LAUTERRPACHT, supra note 198, at 37-49. For a discussion of the necessity for
reasoned opinions in the common law context, see W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 55-67 (1980).
227. This informal review is particularly important in the international context where no
appellate review is available and the uncertainties of customary law create many opportunities
for the exercise of judicial latitude. Further, a clear explanation of reasons, by avoiding the
suspicion of "wide and inarticulate discretion" on the part of the tribunal, increases the ac-
ceptability of the judgment to the parties. This also is especially important in international
adjudication, which is impossible without some form of consent by all parties and where com-
pliance is essentially of a voluntary character. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 198, at 37-43. See
W. REYNOLDS, supra note 226, at 58-59.
228. A decision cannot contribute to the development and clarification of the rules and
principles of international law if it does not explain the principles on which it is based, identify
the relevant facts, and apply the law to the facts. See Charney, Ocean Boundaries, supra note
2, at 584. See W. REYNOLDS, supra note 226, at 59.
In addition, certainty and clarity of the law encourages parties to settle disputes through
negotiations, in accordance with settled law, instead of going to the time and expense of judi-
cial decisionmaking.
It has been posited by those closely involved with the case that by, in effect, "splitting the
difference" between the parties claims and refusing to delineate specific legal principles of
maritime boundary delimitation, the ICJ attempts to discourage litigation. According to this
theory, specific legal principles may encourage litigation if parties cannot tell what decision the
law will dictate in their situation. Each party may feel that the law supports its position. This
idea grew out of discussions at a presentation of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy enti-
tled, "The Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank,
Case" (Dec. 5, 1984).
"Splitting the difference" would be acceptable in an ex aequo et bono decision, but can-
not be justified in a case supposedly decided according to the rules and principles of interna-
tional law. For a discussion of the distinction between these two types of decisions, see infra
notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
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Third, the quality of a Court's decision-making is improved by the process
of exploring, in writing, for review by a critical audience, its own analytic
processes.229
In international law, a distinction is drawn between equity in the sense
of total judicial discretion to achieve a "fair" result and equitable principles
applied as part of the general principles of international law. The Statute of
the ICJ provides for two different kinds of adjudication. The first is adjudi-
cation on the basis of law.230 The second is decision ex aequo et bono.2 31 A
decision ex aequo et bono, available only by agreement of the parties, is
legislative in nature and completely within the Court's discretion.232 Equita-
ble principles in a wider sense, however, are part of the general principles of
international law.2 3 3
This case is clearly not a decision ex aequo et bono.2 s4 In fact, the
229. If a judge has difficulty writing a reasoned opinion in support of a given result, he
may be encouraged to re-examine the result. See W. REYNOLDS, supra note 226, at 59-60.
230. ICJ Statute, supra note 57, art. 38, para. 1. Article 38 of the Statute of the Court
provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto.
231. Id. art. 38, para. 2. Ex aequo et bono is "[a] phrase derived from the civil law
meaning in justice and fairness, according to what is just and good, according to equity and
conscience." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (5th ed. 1979).
232. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 198, at 213-23. Lauterpacht states that adjudication
ex aequo et bono "amounts to an avowed creation of new legal relations between the parties."
Id. at 213. See C. JENKS, supra note 3, at 158-59 and 319-21.
233. What is widely known as principles of equity has long been considered to constitute
a part of international law, and as such they have often been applied by international
tribunals .... A sharp division between law and equity, such as prevails in the adminis-
tration of justice in some states, should find no place in international jurisprudence.
Evenson, supra note 186, at 127 (quoting approvingly Diversion of Water from the River
Meuse (Belg. v. Neth.), 1937 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B No. 70, at 76) (Hudson, J., concurring). See
1982 I.C.J. at 60 (para. 71).
Commentators agree that equitable principles are part of general international law either
under article 38, paragraph 1, or independently of that article. See, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note
3, at 316-427; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 198, at 213.
234. Special Agreement, supra note 51, art. II, para. 1,; Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at
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Chamber admits that it is bound by the statute and required by the parties
to achieve a result on the basis of law .1 5 The Chamber accordingly states
that the fundamental norm of maritime boundary delimitation is that is "is
to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and by the use of
practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic con-
figuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable re-
sult."23 6 The Chamber also claims, in effect, total discretion to choose the
criteria and methods appropriate to each particular case. 3 "
This standard does not, however, relieve the Chamber of its obligation
to explain why the particular criteria chosen are appropriate in this case
and how the methods used and the result reached implement those criteria.
In fact, in decisions not controlled by well-defined rules of law, it is even
more important to carefully explain the reasoning behind the results
reached. Otherwise, decisions on the basis of law and decisions ex aequo et
bono become indistinguishable. 3 8 Here the Chamber clearly does not ade-
quately elaborate its reasoning.
2. Specific Problems
The most glaring instance of the Chamber's use of conclusory language
occurs when the Chamber chooses the equitable criteria it considers appro-
priate. The Gulf of Maine case is the first case delimiting a single maritime
boundary for both continental shelf and fisheries zones." 9 The Chamber
states that delimitations applying to both the continental shelf and the su-
perjacent water column "can only be carried out by the application of...
criteria . . . which [do] not give preferential treatment to one of these two
objects to the detriment of the other, and, at the same time [are] equally
suitable to the division of either of them."24' The Chamber continues by
235. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 278 (para. 59).
236. Id. at 300 (para. 112 (2)).
237. Id. at 313 (para. 158). For a discussion of the Chamber's choice of criteria, see
supra text accompanying notes 135-36 and 155-57. For a discussion of the controversy sur-
rounding the exercise of such broad judicial discretion, see supra text accompanying notes
179-96.
238. Evensen emphasizes that the distinction between the two types of decisions is a very
delicate one which should not be blurred and that, accordingly, "equitable principles should
not operate in a void so as to make the court's decision-making process seem totally discretion-
ary." Evensen, supra note 186, at 128-29.
239. Although the Chamber claims that there are no specific transferable rules in mari-
time boundary delimitation, some of the principles set forth by the Chamber are likely to be
applied to all cases delimiting a single multipurpose maritime boundary. See supra notes 197-
225 and accompanying text.
240. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 327 (para. 194).
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saying summarily that it "feels bound to turn" to geographic criteria, and
that "within this framework it is inevitable" that the Chamber's basic
choice should be the equal division of areas of overlap. 241
The Chamber fails to explain any of these conclusions or to examine
alternatives. The Chamber could, for example, have decided to consider all
criteria relevant to the subsoil, the water column, or both, but given differ-
ent weight to these factors . 42 That possibility is never considered. Perhaps
the Chamber felt that such a detailed analysis would be unnecessarily com-
plicated. Certainly it will be less expensive for countries to litigate maritime
boundary delimitation cases if the pleadings are limited to geographic fac-
tors.248 However, the Chamber does not give this reason or any reason for
considering only factors equally relevant to subsoil and the water column,
or for saying, in essence, that geographic criteria are the only ones fitting
that description.244
241. Id. at 327 (para. 195).
242. See Charney, Ocean Boundaries, supra note 2, where a five-step factor analysis is
suggested.
(1) The functions served by coastal state jurisdiction in the specific ocean zone to be
delimited should be identified.
(2) All the facts concerning the instant boundary area that reflect the functions to be
served by the zone should be identified.
(3) To the extent possible, each piece of information identified in the prior paragraph
should be used to construct a line or range of lines that best suits the function to which it
relates.
(4) These alternative lines and previously identified factors should be studied and
weighed according to their importance. In a process that might even approach vector
analysis, a line that best reflects all the relevant factors in light of their importance to the
zone should be sought.
(5) A cartographical method should be selected to describe the line accurately and
reliably.
Id. at 597 (footnote omitted).
243. Professor Chiu suggests this as a possible reason for limiting the factors considered.
See text preceding note 73 in Chiu, supra note 201.
244. In their article The International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, Edward
Collins and Martin Rogoff provide the kind of reasoned analysis which the Chamber failed to
provide. After exhaustive analysis of the law, they determine that geographical factors should
predominate in delimiting a single maritime boundary for the continental shelf and the exclu-
sive economic zone. Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2 at 51-54. They state that:
The fundamental principles for delimitation of this recently emergent zone must be
gleaned from the legal theory of coastal state entitlement to all off-shore zones, from
conventional and customary law relating to other maritime zones, and from judicial pro-
nouncements that elucidate general principles, which underlie state jurisdiction over sea
areas for purposes of exploitation, management, and conservation. All of these sources
point to an approach that is based essentially on geographical factors and that is similar
to the approach used to delimit continental shelf boundaries.
Id. at 51.
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The Chamber also fails to explain adequately the results of its imple-
mentation of the chosen criteria to delimit the boundary. The Chamber
generally does explain the choices it makes in constructing the first two
segments.245 In constructing the third and longest segment, however, the
Chamber's reasoning is extraordinarily brief. This is by far the most impor-
tant segment of the boundary for it passes through the Georges Bank area.
The Chamber asserts that this segment must be perpendicular to the "clos-
ing line" of the Gulf, starting at the point where the second segment inter-
sects that line.246 The only reasons given for this result are the equal divi-
sion of areas of overlays and the fact that "the land dominates the sea. 2 47
It is unclear how these principles dictate the choice of a perpendicular. In
fact, the third segment is virtually identical to a continuation of the median.
Finally, although the Chamber has refused to consider socio-economic
factors in its initial delimitation, it does consider them later. The Chamber
decides that it must evaluate the line it has constructed to determine
whether it is equitable "in light of all the circumstances which may be
taken into account for purposes of that decision. 2 48 In making this evalua-
tion the Chamber reconsiders the "historical rights" and "economic depen-
dence" arguments of the parties. The decision does not explain why these
arguments are relevant at this stage in any greater detail than it explained
why they were not relevant to the initial delimitation. 24 9 It also fails to ex-
Although the Chamber's conclusions are similar to those of Collins and Rogoff, they are
not based on thorough consideration of the relevant law. In particular, Collins and Rogoff
consider cases beyond the three recent continental shelf decisions, cases more specifically rele-
vant to fisheries jurisdiction. They also consider state practice. See id. at 14-24, 54-61. See
also Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18); Grisbadarna case (Nor.
v. Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 1221 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909) (where a boundary based on
geographical factors was slightly adjusted to recognize historical rights); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25). For books and articles discussing these
cases, see sources cited in Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 54-61.
For a survey of state practice in negotiating single boundary agreements, see Collins &
Rogoff, supra note 2, at 14-24. For maps and analyses of delimited international maritime
boundaries, see OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LiMITs IN THE SEAS (mul-
tipamphlet series).
245. An exception is the Chamber's treatment of proportionality. The Chamber claims
that it is not making an autonomous criterion or method of delimitation out of proportionality,
but it clearly does so. See supra text accompanying notes 212-20.
246. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 337-38 (para. 224).
247. Id. at 338-39 (paras. 226-28).
248. Id. at 339-40 (para. 230).
249. Collins and Rogoff reach the same conclusions the Chamber reaches as to the way in
which historical use and economic dependency should be considered in delimiting a multi-
purpose maritime boundary, but they undertake an exhaustive analysis of the relevant interna-
tional law. Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 54-61. See supra notes 194 & 244.
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plain why it considers only socio-economic factors, and not the other non-
geographic arguments of the parties, in making this final evaluation. In
sum, the Chamber repeatedly comes to conclusions without explaining how
they were reached, leaving the significance and precedential value of the
decision uncertain.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, in the Gulf of Maine case the Chamber applied and ex-
tended the principles of the law of maritime boundary delimitation as they
were formulated in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case. A broad fun-
damental norm of equity was set forth as the only applicable principle of
customary international law, allowing the Chamber broad discretion to de-
cide the case based on whatever equitable criteria and delimitation methods
it found appropriate. This fact-intensive approach will undoubtedly be criti-
cized by those who lamented this trend that began with the Tunisia/Libya
Continental Shelf case.
In spite of claims to the contrary, however, the Chamber does formu-
late specific rules which are likely to be applied in future cases. The Cham-
ber determines that only geographic criteria will be considered in initially
delimiting single maritime boundaries for the subsoil and the water column;
it uses approximations to an equidistance line; it applies proportionality di-
rectly as an independent source of rights; and it decides that non-geo-
graphic criteria may be considered in evaluating the equitableness of a line
after it has been constructed. Because these principles are likely to be ap-
plied in other disputes, it is particularly unfortunate that the Chamber
failed to elaborate carefully the reasoning behind them, making it difficult
to assess the meaning, significance, and future application of the decision.
Nora T. Terres
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